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Abstract
This review paper is intended to outline
some of the main qualitative theoretical
issues involved in the debates on the
results emerging from the Pasinetti
(irrelevance) theorem, which is an
important element of the post-Keynesian
approach to growth and distribution.
Firstly, it is briefly described the
Cambridge (U.K.) vs Cambridge (U.K.)
controversy following the publication of
the original works by Kaldor and
Pasinetti. It is then reviewed the
subsequent Cambridge (U.S.)
vs Cambridge (U.K.) exchange between
Samuelson and Modigliani, on one side,
and Pasinetti, Robinson, and Kaldor on
the other side.
Resumo
Este artigo-resenha descreve algumas das principais
questões teóricas envolvidas nos intensos debates que
se seguiram aos resultados oriundos do teorema (da
irrelevância) de Pasinetti, que é um elemento impor-
tante da abordagem pós-keynesiana do crescimento e
da distribuição. Inicialmente, descreve-se brevemente
a controvérsia Cambridge (RU) vs Cambridge (RU)
que se seguiu à publicação dos trabalhos originais de
Kaldor e Pasinetti. Em seguida, resenha-se o debate
Cambridge (EUA) vs Cambridge (RU) subse-
qüente,queopôs,deumlado,SamuelsoneModiglia-
n i ,e ,d eo u t r o ,P a s i n e t t i ,R o b s i n s o neK a l d o r .
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E25.1_ Introduction
This review paper is intended to outline
some of the main qualitative theoretical
issues involved in the debates on the
results emerging from the so-called
Pasinetti (irrelevance) theorem, which is
a major result in the post-Keynesian
approach to growth and distribution.
T op u ti tm o r ep r e c i s e l y ,i ti si n t e n d e d
to focus on two different stages of that
d e b a t e .F i r s t l y ,t h eC a m b r i d g e( U . K . )vs
Cambridge (U.K.) controversy
following the publication of Kaldor
(1955-1956) and Pasinetti (1962), which
involved Meade (1963 and 1966) and
Meade and Hahn (1965) against
Pasinetti (1964 and 1966a). Secondly,
the Cambridge (U.S.) vs Cambridge
(U.K.) exchange between Samuelson
and Modigliani (1966a and 1966b), on
one side, and Pasinetti (1966b),
Robinson (1966), and Kaldor (1966),
on the other side.
To put it briefly, the essence of
the Pasinetti theorem (1962) is the
following. In a model economy where
there exists a group who receives only
property income (capitalists), the wealth
of that group will grow at a constant
rate, depending on their saving rate and
their rate of return earned. In this case,
long-run equilibrium is defined as a
situation where the distribution of
wealth remains constant; the wealth of
all other groups, and so of the economy
as a whole, must also grow at this same
rate. If, in addition, it is assumed that
the economy grows at a constant
(natural) rate, it follows that the profit
rate of as well as the profits share will
depend only on the saving preferences
of capitalists, while technology and
saving preferences of all other groups
(workers) are irrelevant.1
2_ First act: Cambridge (U.K.) vs
Cambridge (U.K.)
Meade’s (1963) main purpose is to
discuss two propositions concerning
the rate of profit in a steady-state
growth which appear in the
neo-Keynesian approach, namely:
1. that the rate of growth of the
output depends upon the rate of
population growth and the rate
of technical progress, and is
otherwise independent of the
form of the production function;
2.that the profit rate depends solely
upon the rate of output growth
and upon the thriftiness
conditions in the economy and
is otherwise independent of the
form of the production
function.
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1 Since this paper is intended
to focus primarily upon the
earlier qualitative theoretical
issues involved in these
debates, and due to (binding)
space constraints, the reader is
directed to the original works
for a complete development
of the mathematical
counterpart of those issues.
I would recall that most of
these original works and the
immediately subsequent
related literature, whic
is not discussed in the
compass of this paper, were
gathered in the volume edited
b yC a r l oP a n i c oa n dN e r i
Salvadori (1993).As Meade and Hahn (1965) were
to recall later on, Meade (1963) was
concerned to demonstrate the
neoclassical result that the very long run
rate of profit in a golden age will
depend upon technology if in that age
all people both work and own property.
In order to consider those
neo-Keynesian propositions in the
neoclassical system, Meade (1963)
assumes a simple Cobb-Douglas
production function. After several
algebraic manipulations, he shows that
with unitary elasticities of substitution
between the factors of production
added to Pasinetti’s (1962) assumptions,
the neoclassical result will be true if
sV  (sQ W/1 ), where sV stands for
the capitalists’ (who do not work and
save a fixed proportion of their income)
propensity to save, SW for the workers’
propensity to save and Q for the
marginal product of labor. On the other
hand, the neo-Keynesian result will be
true if ss VW  /(1  Q). As for the two
neo-Keynesian propositions stated
above, Meade concludes that
they are dependent
1.upon two special assumptions
about the production function,
namely, that there are only two
factors of production and that it
is the Harrodian and not the
Hicksian rate of technical
progress which is independent
of the other features of the
production function;
2.upon the assumption that the
thriftiness conditions are such
that the ratio of total savings to
income, s, can be expressed as a
constant proportion of the
marginal product of capital, u.
In his reply to Meade (1963),
Pasinetti (1964) emphasizes that one
must take a Cobb-Douglas production
function as necessarily representing the
technical characteristics of the real
world in order to accept Meade’s
conclusions, a view that Pasinetti is not
inclined to take. For Pasinetti, Meade’s
constant procedure consists in singling
out a sort of critical value of some
parameter and then in saying: if the
parameter is less than so much, the
neo-Keynesian result holds and if , on
the other hand, the parameter is more
than so much, the neoclassical result
holds. Pasinetti argues that such
procedure gives the reader an
impression of symmetry which does not
correspond to the substance of Meade’s
results, for the latter’s two alternatives
are profoundly asymmetrical. More
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neo-Keynesian result holds” the actual
meaning is “the neo-Keynesian result
holds in general”, that is, both within
the neo-Keynesian and within the
neoclassical theoretical framework. On
the other hand, when he says that “the
neoclassical result holds” the actual
meaning, it is replied, the actual
meaning “only within the limits of
neoclassical assumptions”.
Pasinetti claims that this point
must be explicitly pointed out because
when Meade arrives at results which
differ from his, Meade’s conclusions
depend crucially on:
1. the rejection of Pasinetti’s (1962)
restriction that the workers’
saving propensity must be smaller
than the ratio of investment to
income (sI Y W  / ), meaning
that workers’ total saving are less
than required (equilibrium)
investment;
2.the assumption of infinite
substitutability between labor
and capital so that, no matter
how small workers’ saving
propensity might be, workers’
savings alone will suffice to
keep up full employment
investment.
Therefore, Pasinetti replies,
Meade’s statement about the
(aforementioned) conditions under
which whether neo-Keynesian or
neoclassical results will hold is
incorrect; for Meade has not added to,
but rather replaced, the original
assumptions. Actually, in Pasinetti’s
view, to introduce the restriction that
the workers’ saving propensity must be
smaller than the ratio of investment to
income in fact implies that the
neoclassical result is never true.
To phrase it another way, let us
recall that a distinctive property of the
Pasinetti theorem is that, within the
range in which it is valid, that is,
sI Y W  / , it is independent of any
assumption about whether and how
technology (in the sense of the
capital-output ratio) is influenced by
changes in the profit rate. Indeed,
Meade (1963) accepted this result,
although he preferred to state that
restriction in terms of savings, instead
of in terms of investments, by writing
ss W  c (PY / ), where PY / is the ratio of
profit to income (in Meade’s
terminology1  Q). Meade then
proceeded to examine the case in which
that restriction is reversed and claimed
that in such case the long-run
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eventually follow is such that the
capital-output ratio (and not the rate of
profits) is equal to the natural rate of
growth divided by the workers’
saving propensity.
In this context, Pasinetti’s (1964)
contention is that this second, neoclassical
result – the neo-Keynesian one – does not
have general validity. For, as soon as we
investigate the range in which the
inequality ss W  c (PY / ) is reversed,
assumptions about technology become
relevant, and the conclusions depend
crucially on the assumptions. That is, when
this inequality is satisfied, the relation
defining the equilibrium profit rate
follows, whatever one’s assumptions about
production technology might be.
H o w e v e r ,w h e nt h es a m ei n e q u a l i t yi s
reversed, as Meade does, his results do not
necessarily follow, unless it is added the
assumption of a well-behaved production
function allowing substitution between
capital and labor in response to changes in
the profit rate. It would be possible, say, to
make other (quite reasonable) assumptions
on technology, under which Meade’s result
would never follow. In our view, it is
essentially this very asymmetry that
Pasinetti’s reply to Meade was meant
to point out.
In their rejoinder to Pasinetti’s
(1964) reply, Meade and Hahn (1965)
recall that Meade (1963) was concerned
to show that the long-run profit rate in
a golden age will depend upon
technology if, in that age, all people
both work and own property.
Moreover, he also gave a simple
account of how such a stage might
come about even if, at some initial date,
there were people who only owned
wealth and did not work. Hence,
Meade and Hahn interpret Pasinetti’s
(1964) reply as
i. claiming that these results
depend on the assumption of
infinite substitutability between
labor and capital;
ii. stressing that he had in any case
assumed that people who both
work and save can never save
enough to allow full
employment growth.
Their purpose is then to argue
that the claim under (i) above is false
and that, in an important respect, the
assumption under (ii) above begs the
real question at issue.
In order to (presumably) get as
far away as possible from any
implication of infinite substitutability
between capital and labor, they
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a finite number of discrete production
processes are available. Following
Pasinetti (1962), they suppose that there
are two groups of people, pure
capitalists and those who both work and
own wealth. If they are accumulating
property at different proportionate
rates, the asset distribution will vary so
that three possibilities exist for a
long-run equilibrium situation where
further changes in assets distribution
cease to play a role:
a.the proportion of assets owned
by workers may become
negligibly small;
b.the asset distribution may remain
constant through time;
c.the proportion of assets owned
by pure capitalists may become
negligibly small.
In cases (a) and (b), it is argued,
t h ee v e n t u a lr a t eo fp r o f i tm u l t i p l i e db y
the capitalist’s saving propensity will
equal the rate of growth; this is
Pasinetti’s case. But in case (c), savings
will eventually become proportional to
income, and this is the case investigated
by Meade (1963).
To examine the analytical
implications of such dependence, let us
recall that the golden age natural growth
rate, g n, must be equal to the growth
rate of capital stock. If savings
(= investment) is a fixed proportion, sp,
of profits, P,t h e nsp P/KI  /Kg n  ,
and hence P/Kg n  /sp,w h e r eK is the
capital stock. When, however, I is a
fixed proportion, sy, of income,Y,w e
have syY/KI  /K,s ot h a tKY g n /  .
In other words, the income-capital
ratio, but not the profit-capital ratio, is
now independent of technology. In this
case, they maintain, to know the
equilibrium profit rate, we must
therefore solve for the whole system,
which then will involve the
technological aspects of the economy.
Moreover, they claim that case (c) does
not depend upon the assumption of
infinite substitutability between labor
and capital, but is compatible with the
(book-of-blueprints) technology
assumed by them.
They argue that Pasinetti actually
ruled out case (c) by his assumption
that the saving propensity of those who
both work and own capital, sW ,i sl e s s
than the ratio of full-employment
investment to income (IY / ), an
assumption, they believe, begs the
question. For in golden-age growth, we
have IK g n /  and also IY g n /  (KY / ),
which means that the condition
nova Economia_Belo Horizonte_13 (2)_11-36_julho-dezembro de 2003
Whose saving behavior really matters in the long run? 16assumed by Pasinetti, sI Y W  / ,c a nb e
alternatively expressed as the
assumption that in the golden age we
have sg Wn  (KY / )o r( KY / )(sg Wn / ).
This assumption, however, could
legitimately be made a priori – without
investigating the general conditions of
the golden-age equilibrium, which will
depend on demand conditions and
relative prices as well as upon
technological possibilities – only in case
the book of blueprints contained no set
of activities which is sufficiently labor
intensive to reduce the capital-output
ratio below the given level gs nW / .
This might be so if sW was
negligibly small or if the available
technology did not include any very
labor-intensive methods. If this were
the case, they maintain, Pasinetti’s
results would apply. More precisely, if
we happened to start from a position in
which a very small proportion of
property were owned by the pure
capitalists, then in these conditions the
rate of investment would not be
sufficient to keep the growth of capital
stock in line with the growth of labor,
even when the most intensive-intensive
techniques were chosen, and
unemployment would result. For full
employment, the real wage rate would
have to be reduced until the distribution
of income were shifted to profits until
the savings propensity of the
community were sufficient to
correspond to a rate of investment
which generated a sufficient supply of
real capital to employ all the available
labor. To put it another way, the
equilibrium value of the marginal
product of labor Q would not be great
enough to make sp (1  Q) sW .
But they raise the following question:
what if in the real world the minimum
technologically possible value of KY /
is less than sg Wn / ?I nt h e i rv i e w ,
Pasinetti could, of course, legitimately
build a model in which this is just
assumed not to be the case. But it may
be the case, and what Meade (1963) did
was simply to claim the right to
examine the possibility.
As mentioned above, Pasinetti’s
(1964) reply to Meade (1963) was meant
to point out a clear asymmetry between
his results and Meade’s. For Pasinetti
(1966a), even though Meade and Hahn
(1965) had restated those problems in
terms of a book-of-blueprints approach
instead of a smooth production
function, their results are subject to
exactly the same asymmetry. Actually, it
is pointed out, the necessity of
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function allowing substitution between
capital and labor in response to changes
in the profit rate is not discussed by
them, their purpose simply seeming to
be that of denying the necessity of
postulating infinite substitutability.
F o rP a s i n e t t i ,e v e nt om a k et h i s
mild claim, a further restriction is
necessary, and one that does destroy the
alleged symmetry between the range in
which the neo-Keynesian condition
ss W  c (PY / ) is satisfied and the
range in which such condition is
reversed (the neoclassical case). He
argues that this restriction is implicitly
introduced, as seen above, when they
consider the case sg k Wn  *–i nt h e i r
terminology sg Wn  (KY / )–w h e r ek*
is the capital-output ratio entailed by
the least capital-intensive technique
which is known. In Pasinetti’s view, one
should realize that when the restriction
sg k Wn  *is imposed, one can no
longer simply talk of reversal of the
inequality given by ss W  c(PY / ). More
precisely, one must talk of reversal of
the latter supplemented by the former.
Notice that reversal of the latter and
nonfulfillment of the former provides,
by the way, an example in which the
latter is reversed, and yet Meade’s
results do not follow. Pasinetti also
maintains that no such restriction
appears in Meade’s (1963) original
analysis. There, the results are presented
as valid (for any positive rate of growth)
whatever value, however small, sW may
have, except that it should be
nonnegative. It is with reference to this
claim – Pasinetti (1966a) readily
emphasizes – that the term infinite was
used in Pasinetti (1964), for in order to
make it one has to assume infinite
substitutability between capital and labor.
3_ Second act: Cambridge (U.S.) vs
Cambridge (U.K.)
The purpose of the study and
elucidation of the Pasinetti’s theorem
set forth by Samuelson and Modigliani
(1966a, hereafter SM), are threefold .
First, it is intended to show the limited
range of the workers and capitalists
saving coefficients within which that
t h e o r e mi sv a l i d .O u t s i d et h a tr a n g e ,
SM believe to have formulated a
t h e o r e mt h a ti sd u a lt oi t–a n do ft h e
same generality. It too involves a
paradox, namely, that the average
product of the capital – the reciprocal
of the capital-output ratio – to which
the system will settle is, this time, equal
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of the propensity to save out of profits
of the pure capitalists or the form of
production function. On the other
hand, all the other golden-age variables
of the system depend only upon gs nW /
and on the form of production
functions so that the complete duality
of all these results with the Pasinetti
theorem would be notable.
Second, it is intended to dispel
the (presumed by SM) erroneous notion
that Pasinetti’s analysis has some
peculiar relevance to a Kaldorian
alternative theory of distribution or to
some version of a Cambridge theory of
distribution. SM point out that, as
Pasinetti himself made clear, his analysis
is one of the greatest generality, in the
sense that his theorem applies in fact to
any system capable of a golden-age
growth path. For SM, it is precisely
because of this great generality that
Pasinetti’s analysis can, in no way, help
us to define income distribution. To
make this point clear, their analysis deal
primarily with a neoclassical production
function capable of a smooth factor
substitution and with the case of
perfectly competitive markets, under
which conditions competition will
enforce, at all times, equality of factor
prices to factor marginal productivities.
Thirdly, SM investigate – and
claim to have proved – the stability of
the Pasinetti golden age in the case
where it is valid. To put it another way,
SM intend to prove that the system will
asymptotically approach the steady state
from arbitrary initial conditions, at least
in a local neighborhood of that state.
And where their anti-Pasinetti golden
age is argued to hold, in which the
workers’ saving propensity is all
important, they intend to demonstrate
its global asymptotic stability.
After some algebraic
manipulations of their production
function-type system, SM come up with
an equation representing (what would
be) the basic result of the Pasinetti
theorem, f i’(k*)  rg s nc */ ,w h e r ek*
andr*stand for the steady state
equilibrium values of the
capital-intensive ratio and the rate
of profit, respectively. In turn, the
nonnegativity conditions given by
kW  0andkc  0, can be easily
s h o w nt oi m p l yss Wc  and
sa W  (k*)sc g n  [kf */ (k*)],
respectively, wherekW stands for the
workers’ capital,kc for the capitalists’
capital anda(k) rk f k /( ) ,f o rt h e
income share accruing to capital. It is
claimed that the latter inequality is more
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capital share,a(k), is generally less than
one, and empirically very much less.
Thus, ifa(k*) = 0.25 and Sc=0 . 2 ,
Pasinetti’s theorem, when derived in
this way, could not hold for sSW higher
than a modest 0.05. Besides, SM claim
that the latter inequality has some
correspondence to Pasinetti’s restriction
given by SI K W  / , to the extent that in
the steady state given by
IK / (dK dt / )(1/K)=( dL dt / )(1/L)  g n,
we have IK gKY g nn //  [kf / (k)].
In their view, however,
Pasinetti’s simple inequality is
ill-defined, for outside of the steady
state, IY / could take any value
whatever. Furthermore, even on the
equilibrium growth path, the expression
f(k)/k is not a given of the problem but
a characteristic of the solution, if any.
Except possibly in the very special case
of fixed production coefficients, where
KY / might be identified with the
technologically determined (minimum)
capital coefficient. For SM, their
inequality sa W  (k*)sg cn  [kf */ (k*)],
in turn, has the merit of making explicit
what must not be left ill-defined: that
the inequality given by sa W  (k*)sc
must hold precisely atkk  *,t h ek that
corresponds torg s n */  c.
The main conclusion, drawn by
SM so far, is therefore that the
numerical range of the parameter SW ,
for which Pasinetti’s theorem is
applicable, is severely limited. Besides,
they argue that the behavior of the
system out of this range is covered by a
theorem complementary to Pasinetti’s
theorem, its Dual. In order to prove
their Dual theorem – which states that
the average product of capital or the
reciprocal of the capital-output ratio, to
which the system will settle, is equal to
gs nW / and independent of the
propensity to save out of profits or the
form of production function – SM start
by examining what happens whenkc 0
fails to hold, when
sg k f Wn  */ (k*)  gA n/ (k*)=ak s (* ) c,
where A(k*)=KY / stands for the
average product of capital. In this case,
eventually the rate of growth of
capitalists’ assets will become and
remain smaller than the rate of growth
of workers’ assets and also smaller than
g n.T h i si nt u r nm e a n st h a t ,
asymptotically, Kc K / – the capitalists’
share of total wealth – will approach
zero while the workers’ share, KK W/ ,
will approach unity; withkc tending to
vanish, the limiting behavior of the
system then reduces to the familiar
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of savers, namely the workers. Once
workers’ saving starts dominating, we
are then in the domain of the
anti-Pasinetti dual theorem. In such a
situation, profit rate, capital-labor, and
capital-output ratios and, therefore, also
the distribution of income between
wages and profits are fully independent
of the capitalists’ propensity to save.
But while the average product of capital
(and its reciprocal the capital-output
ratio) is independent, even the form of
production function, thus depending
only upon the rate of growth and the
workers’ saving propensity, the
remaining ratios and the rate of profit
depend on sg Wn / and on the form of
production function.
Indeed, they insist upon the
generality of their formal analysis.
Though most of the above seems to
rest on marginal productivity notions,
they argue that no direct use was
actually made of marginal productivity
relations. For instance, there would be
no necessity to identify the profit-rate
relationsrf  i’(k)w i t hdf k dk () /.
Indeed, all we need is thatr should be a
determinate function of KL / and the
that function need not be the above
derivative. In their own words,
even if there are no smooth
substitutability properties posited for
[the given] production function or even if
Chamberlain imperfect competition
intervenes in factor or commodity
markets, our analysis can still be
applied. If Kalecki, or Boulding, or
Hahn, or Kaldor, or Schneider, or
Walter Reuther, or Thünen come
forward with some alternative theory of
distribution, provided only that the
profit rate is a declining function of the
r a t i oo fc a p i t a lt oi n t e n s i v e–c a l li t
rK L (/) – both the Pasinetti
formalism and our various duals and
generalizations of them remain valid
(Samuelson and Modigliani, 1966a, p. 287).
In his reply, Pasinetti’s (1966b)
main contention is that their analysis
has a serious drawback, namely, it was
w r i t t e nw i t ht h ea i mo fd e f e n d i n ga
specific theory – the theory of marginal
productivity of capital. As such,
therefore, it has compelled SM to fit
Pasinetti’s new result within the rigid
constraints of a preconceived
framework, his (1966b) purpose then
being to point out the quite restrictive
consequences of such an approach.
He claims this new result is that
– whether or not we believe in the
existence of something called marginal
productivity of capital – the long-run
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proviso that sI Y W  / – turns out to be
determined according to the relation
PK s /( /  1 c)/( / ) IK, which is fully
independent of marginal productivity
assumptions. For Pasinetti, SM, though
admitting that the marginal productivity
theory of capital has become
unnecessary to explain the long-run
profit rate (an admission which he
infers from SM’s remark quoted in the
previous paragraph), actually pursue a
second line of defense. That is, he sees
their contribution as an attempt to
show that, though the “paradox”
(i. e. the relation above) is true, it is not
incompatible with the marginal
productivity theory. The reason is that,
if one does believe in marginal
productivity and if one is willing to
make the required assumptions, one
can always claim that, in the long run,
the marginal productivity of capital will
become equal to the (independently
determined) profit rate. That is, the rate
of profit, in the long run, determines
what the marginal productivity of
capital is going to be.
For Pasinetti, these arguments are
unconvincing, since marginal productivity
is a concept, which was invented in
order to explain the rate of profit.
Professors Samuelson and Modigliani
now seem to turn the problem round and
aim at using the rate of profit in order
to explain and justify the concept of
marginal productivity.
The whole procedure seems to me
artificial and unnecessary. It looks like
building a superfluous and complicated
scaffolding around a construction which
stands on its own.
(Pasinetti, 1966b, p. 303-304, original emphasis).
He begins by recalling the
precise limits within which the
Cambridge equation is valid, namely,
sI Y k I K W  /( / ) .A sr e g a r d st h e
above-mentioned contention by SM
that such restriction is ill-defined
because IK / refers to equilibrium
situations and because (in their
analysis, though not in Pasinetti’s,
according to the latter’s view) it is not
a given of the problem but a
characteristic of the solution, he
replies as follows:
It is exactly for this reason that I find
‘ill-defined’ their own formulation of the
same condition, namely, SS W  c PY / ,
where PY / is indeed referred to
equilibrium situations and is not a given
of the problem but a characteristic of the
s o l u t i o n( t h i st i m ei ntheir own
analysis, as well as in mine).
(Pasinetti, 1966b, p. 304, f. 1, original emphasis).
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when sI Y W  / ,t h e r ei sa
correspondent growth path on which
the proportion of the total capital stock
owned by the workers tends to unity.
When one looks at these problems
from the point of view of marginal
productivity theory, it is added, it is
almost inevitable that one should
become attracted (as SM do) by this
particular case, simply because, by
having only one category of savers, it
becomes analogous to the case treated
in neoclassical economic models. Let us
recall that SM quoted two specific
reasonable figures for PY / and Sc
(respectively, 0.25 and 0.20), thus
concluding that the condition for the
validity of the Pasinetti’s theorem
would cease to be satisfied for sW any
higher than a modest 5 percent.
Pasinetti, in turn, by taking figures
supposedly closer to those observed,
shows that that the critical level for sW
would in fact be of the order
of 12 to 16 percent.
But let us leave aside the details
of their alternative calculations and
focus upon the theoretical side of the
controversy. Following Pasinetti, let us
suppose that the proviso above were
not to be satisfied. Yet, to suppose so
does not yet mean that sW and IY /
should be exactly equal; sW might well
be more than IY / . Actually, SM take a
further step, for they add an
assumption borrowed from marginal
productivity theory, namely, that the
capital-output ratio is a smooth
monotonic declining function of the
profit rate within the considered range.
If the usual limitations are imposed that
such parameters should be nonnegative,
this range goes in fact from zero to
infinity, which means infinite
possibilities of substitution between
capital and intensive in response to
opposite changes in the profit rate
Thanks to this assumption, he
adds, cases given by sI Y W  / are
excluded, the reason being that IY / ,
when it is not less than SW ,a l w a y s
becomes equal to sW . In the analysis set
forth by SM, therefore, either sI Y W  /
or sI Y W  / , for there can never be
SI Y W  / . But then he correctly raises
the question of whether this
assumption may be justified. Given that
the capital-output ratio is a
macroeconomic magnitude which is
composed of all the prices and all the
physical quantities of commodities,
Pasinetti argues that there appears to be
no theoretical justification at all for
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should be a monotonic decreasing
function of the rate of profit (let alone
that it should be a smooth function,
and that it should go from zero to near
infinity). Pasinetti claims that this
assumption is crucial to that part of
SM’s analysis which relies on IY /
becoming equal to sW i. e.t ot h e i rD u a l
Theorem so that the latter, though
appearing formally symmetrical to
Pasinetti’s, is actually substantially not
symmetrical to it. While it depends
crucially on that assumption, thus
breaking down any time that it does not
hold, Pasinetti’s theorem is valid
independently of it.
As regards SM’s contention that
his theorems have no peculiar relevance
to a Kaldorian alternative theory of
distribution or to some version of a
Cambridge theory of distribution,
Pasinetti, though agreeing with them
that his formulation of the Cambridge
equation is one of great generality,
correctly adds that one should not infer
from this that it is irrelevant for such
theories. According to Pasinetti, his
analysis is rather a necessary ingredient
of all of them; in particular, it is relevant
to Kaldor’s theory of income
distribution more than to any other.
In her pertinent comment on
SM, Robinson (1966) focuses upon
their analysis of the limits within which
a Pasinetti golden age is actually
possible. She begins by recalling that, in
any period, net profit is equal to net
investment plus the excess of
consumption out of profits over savings
out of wages, a relation implied by the
following identities:
Pasinetti divides sp into two parts, sc
which applies to profits accruing to
capitalists,rK c,a n dsW which applies to
profits on the part of capital owned by
workers,rKW ,r being uniform on all
capital. In a Pasinetti equilibrium, with
the share of capital owned by each class
equal to its share in net saving, the extra
expenditure out of profits accruing to
workers (due to the excess of sc over
sW ) offsets savings out of wages. Profits
a r et h e ne q u a lt oi n v e s t m e n tp l u s
expenditure by capitalists and the rate
of profitis equal to gs / c.
Robinson argues that when there
is a choice of a known technique (which
according to her at M.I.T. means
differences in the quantity of
putty-capital per man employed) and it
is postulated that investment is
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YPW ICI s P p 	 	 		 	 () 1( ) 1  sW Wembodied in profit-maximizing form,
we can draw up a pseudo-production
function (Solow’s name for it) showing
output per man employed, real wage,
and value of capital per man,
corresponding to each profit rate. Then
in a Pasinetti golden age, with gg n 
andrgs n  / c,w ec a nf i n dt h e
appropriate value of KY / and so
determine the profit share,rK Y / .I nh e r
view, SM (following Meade) are able to
s t r i k eab l o wf o rKY / by showing that
it enters into the determination of the
limits within which a Pasinetti golden
age is actually possible.
Let us recall that Pasinetti stated
the condition as sI Y W  / . Robinson
argues that this is perfectly correct, but
it does not bring out the effect of the
share of wages in income on the share
of workers’ saving in investment so that
the condition is most perspicuously
stated as sY s W  crK.I fsY s W  crK,
equilibrium with the profit rate constant
through time requires the whole capital
to be owned by workers for, if the
proportion of capital owned by workers
is changing as total capital increases, the
rate of profit will not be constant. Then
two classes of savers do not exist and
the system reduces itself to a Harrod
equilibrium withYI s  / .F o ra
Harrod-equilibrium golden age,
however, KY / must be equal to sg n / .
In order to show that a Harrod
equilibrium is possible for all values of s
and g n, SM assume a well-behaved
pseudo-production, with KY / –a
smooth, continuous decreasing function
of the rate of profit. For Robinson
(1966, p. 290-291, f. 1), though SM
admit that there is no logical reason
why the pseudo-production function
should be of this form, they just assume
that it is so, an assumption that leads
her to conclude:
After putting the rabbit into the hat in full
view of the audience it does not seem
necessary to make so much fuss about
drawing it out again. (Robinson, 1966, p. 308).
B u ti ti sn o ts u f f i c i e n t ,s h ea d d s ,
to postulate that KY / can assume any
required value, so that a question which
arises regards to whether there is some
mechanism to cause it to be equal to
sg n / . In her view, this poses no
problem for SM, for they think of
savings as consisting in accumulating
putty. When sg n / is greater than KY / ,
putty per man employed is rising, the
rate of profits falling and KY / rising,
and contrariwise when KY / is greater
than sg n / .I no t h e rw o r d s ,i na
Harrod-type golden age equilibrium,
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Is P s W 	  () 1 , but in order to know
t h er a t eo fp r o f i t s ,PK / ,w eh a v et o
look at the pseudo-production function
to find K. Actually, KY / is equal to
sg n / , simply because, if it were not, this
would not be a Harrodian golden age.
Thus, given s, g n and a well-behaved
pseudoproduction there is one rate of
profit at which a Harrod golden age is
not impossible; if the function is badly
behaved there may be several or none.
With Pasinetti’s assumptions, on the
other hand, there can be a golden age at
any rate of profit with any
pseudoproduction function provided
that sY s W  crK;w h e nsW 0,ag o l d e n
age is possible at any profit rate. Indeed,
such alternative (to Pasinetti’s above
mentioned) demonstration of a clear
asymmetry between Pasinetti’s theorem
and SM’s anti-Pasinetti theorem is one
of the most interesting feature of
Robinson’s intervention in the debate.
Kaldor’s (1966) comment on SM
was as well intended to point out the
unrealistic nature of most of the
assumptions behind their theoretical
results. In their analysis, he maintains,
there is no room for phenomena such
as increasing returns, learning by doing,
oligopolistic competition, uncertainty,
obsolescence and other such
troublesome ones that mar the world
as we know it. As regards SM’s
contention that any macroeconomic
theory, which makes use of the notion
of differences in savings propensities
between profits and wages, requires an
identifiable class of hereditary barons –
that is, a class of capitalists with
permanent membership – distinguished
by a high savings propensity and as
well as of a permanent class of
workers, distinguished by a low savings
propensity, Kaldor replies that he
always regarded the high savings
propensity out of profits as something
which attaches to the nature of business
income and not to the wealth (or other
peculiarities) of the individuals who
own property.
In his view, it is the enterprise,
not the particular body of individuals
owning it at any one time, which finds
it necessary, in a dynamic world of
increasing returns, to plough back a
proportion of the profits earned as a
kind of “prior charge” on earnings in
order to ensure the survival of the
enterprise in the long run. According to
him, this is sufficient to refute SM’s
contention that, provided the savings
propensity of workers is high enough,
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high savings propensity) will be
gradually eliminated so that, in a
golden-age equilibrium, only one
savings propensity is left. Let us recall
that in order to show that, SM consider
a situation in which the basic Pasinetti
inequality, namely, that the share of
investment in total income is higher
than the share of savings in wages
(or in total personal income) does not
hold as regards the equilibrium level of
investment. Ironically enough, it is
concluded, the end of it all is not a
violent revolution, à la Marx, but the
cosy world of Harrod, Domar, and
Solow, where there is only a single
savings propensity applicable
to the economy.
For Kaldor, the simple response
to all this is that, if the Kaldor-Pasinetti
inequality is not satisfied, no Keynesian
macrotheory of distribution could
survive for an instant, let alone in a
golden-age equilibrium. In other words,
if the equilibrium level of investment
were less than the workers’ savings, it is
impossible to contemplate that
investment should play the active role
and savings the passive role; for, if we
assumed that investment decisions were
autonomous, either the full
employment assumption would break
down or profits would have to be
negative and, in either case, it is clearly
inconceivable that profits should be
determined by the need to generate
sufficient savings to finance investment.
Kaldor then concludes that
[it is easy to refute Pasinetti by
postulating conditions in which the
Pasinetti model could not possibly work,
and where therefore something else must
take its place (...) Samuelson and
Modigliani assume, as a matter of
course, that it must be Walras. In
disproving Pasinetti they conjure up a
Walrasian world in all its purity – a
world in which all savings get invested
somehow, without disturbing full
employment] (Kaldor, 1966, p. 312).
As regards to SM’s recourse to
some reasonable figures for PY / and
sc (0.25 and 0.20, respectively) in order
to show that the condition for the
validity of the Pasinetti’s theorem
would cease to be satisfied for sW
higher than 5 percent, Kaldor argues
that in their demonstration they make
several slips, so that their conclusion
does not follow.
He is equally skeptical about
SM’s claim that their results do not
depend on marginal productivity
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which all their results require, is the
postulate that the profit rate should be a
single-valued function,,o ft h e
capital-intensive ratio, with’ 0.F o r
Kaldor, what is problematic about their
claim is that no reason whatever is
adduced to show why such assumption
is any less restrictive than the whole bag
of tricks specified in the neoclassical
formulation of their model, in which
they postulate a (constant return to
scale) production function, yf  i’(k),
with f i’(k)0and f’(k) 0as well as
neoclassical smoothness and
substitutability and perfect markets,
under which conditions competition
will enforce equality of factor prices to
factor marginal productivities.
According to Kaldor, the assumption of
a functional relation between the rate of
profits and the capital-labor ratio is
implied in the assumption underlying
that bag of tricks, it being purely
arbitrary without them. Nor is any
attempt made to support the validity
(or plausibility) of such an assumption
empirically. For Kaldor, KL / , unlike
KY / , showed the widest of variations
between the different countries – it was
perhaps twenty times as high in the U.S.
as in India – whilst the rate of profits
was often to be found to be higher in
countries with a relatively high KL /
than with a low one.
Finally, he develops a
Neo-Pasinetti theorem which is argued
to hold in any steady growth rate and
does not postulate a class of hereditary
capitalists with a special high-saving
propensity. Let us recall that the
Pasinetti theorem shows that, under
certain conditions, the rate of profits, in
a true long-run, golden-age equilibrium,
does not depend on the workers’
savings rate, because the additional
consumption out of the workers’
property income will offset their
savings out of wage income. Kaldor
claims that the difficulty with this
proposition (apart from the fact that it
would occur in the “very long run”) is
that it assumes that workers spend the
same fraction of their income,
irrespective of whether it accrues to
them as property income or wages.
However, in a world where enterprises
are organized as corporations, and
property income takes the form of
dividends, this would imply
overspending their dividend income by
the exact fraction required to make
their consumption equal to() 1  sP WW ,
irrespective of the division of profits
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dividends. Besides, once we allow
spending in excess of divided income,
t h e r ei sn or e a s o nt oc o n f i n es u c h
spending to workers, for capitalists also
spend some part of their capital gains,
or even their capital, in the absence of
such gains.
Thus, at any time there must be
capitalists (or shareholders) who
overspend their current (dividend)
i n c o m e( a n dt h es a m em u s tb et r u e ,o f
course, of retired workers who consume
their accumulated savings over the years
of retirement) just as there are active
workers who save a certain fraction of
their income for retirement. Just as net
savings out of income sets up a demand
for securities, net disavings out of
income (= net consumption out of
capital or capital gains) sets up a supply
of securities. There is also a net supply of
new securities issued by the corporate
sector. Since, in the security market,
prices will tend to a level at which the
total (nonspeculative) supply and
demand for securities are equal, there
must be some mechanism to ensure
that the spending out of capital
(or capital gains) just balances the
savings out of income less new securities
issued by corporations.
As for the details of the model,
he divides the community into wage
and salary earners,W , who save some
fraction of their income during their
working life and consume it in
retirement. As long as the population is
rising and income per head is rising, the
savings of the working population must
exceed the disavings of the retired
population by an amount which can be
expressed as some fraction, sW ,o f
current wage-and-salary income. He
also assumes that the shareholders’ net
consumption out of capital (i. e.t h e i r
consumption in excess of their dividend
income) is some fraction,c,o ft h e i r
capital gains,G. Finally, he supposes
that corporations, having decided on
retaining a fraction, s c, of their profits,
decide in addition to issue new
securities equal to some fraction,i,o f
their current investment expenditure,
gK. Thus, equilibrium in the security
market requires that sW c G i g K W 	 ,
which means that at least one of these
items must be responsive to changes in
the market value of securities. Such an
item iscG,s i n c eG is nothing else than
the change in the market value of
securities, and it varies not only with
t h er i s ei nd i v i d e n d sa n de a r n i n g sp e r
share, but also with the valuation ratio,v,
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value of shares to the capital employed
by corporations (or the “book value”
of assets).
After several algebraic
manipulations, Kaldor (1966) derives
solutions for the profit rate and the
valuation ratio whose interpretation is
as follows. Given the savings
coefficients and the capital-gains-
consumption coefficient, there will be a
certain valuation ratio which will secure
just enough savings by the personal
sector to take up the new securities
issues by corporations. Thus, the net
savings of the personal sector (available
for investment by the business sector)
will depend not only on the savings
propensity of individuals, but also on
the policies of the corporations towards
new issues. In the absence of new
issues the level of securities will be
established at the point at which the
purchases of securities by savers will be
just balanced by the sale of securities of
the disavers, making the net savings of
the personal sector equal to zero.
The issue of new securities by
corporations will depress security prices
(i. e. the valuation ratio) just enough to
reduce the sale of securities by the
disavers sufficiently to induce the net
savings required to take up the new
issues. Ifi were negative and
corporations were net purchasers of
securities from the personal sector, the
valuation ratio would be driven up to
the point at which net personal savings
w o u l db en e g a t i v et ot h ee x t e n t
necessary to match the sale of securities
to the corporate sector. It should be
mentioned that Kaldor’s analysis
assumes that savings out of dividends
are zero;cGis seen as the net excess of
shareholders’ consumption over
dividend income.
In a golden-age equilibrium
(given a constant g, and a constant
KY / ),v will be constant, with a value
that can be greater or smaller than 1,
depending upon the values of sc, SW ,c
andi. In fact, all that one can eventually
assert is that, given the Pasinetti
inequality, gK s Y W  ,v  1when
cs W  () 1 ,i 0;w i t hi 0this will be
true a fortiori. Thus, the profit rate in a
golden-age equilibrium,
PK g i s /( ) /  1 c , will be independent
of the personal savings propensities, sW
andc.I ti si nt h i sw a yt h a tK a l d o r ’ s
Neo-Pasinetti theorem is similar to the
original Pasinetti theorem, though it is
reached by a different route. Besides, it
will hold in any steady-state growth, and
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does not postulate a class of hereditary
capitalists with a special high-saving
propensity. In the special case given by
i 0, it reduces to Pasinetti´s version of
the Cambridge equation given by
PK gS //  c.
Let us now turn to SM’s (1966b)
reply to Pasinetti’s (1966b) and
Robinson’s (1966) comments on their
neoclassical reformulation of Pasinetti’s
hypothesis. It is worthy of mention that
they do not reply to Kaldor (1966), the
alleged reason being that Kaldor’s paper
reached them too late. In any case, SM
begin by recalling that the major
motivation for undertaking the original
paper stemmed from the perception that
the Pasinetti golden-age equilibrium,
instead of being the general one, had to
be recognized as but one of two
golden-age equilibria, being matched by
a Dual or Anti-Pasinetti one. As is the
usual case for duality relations, SM adds,
there is complete symmetry between the
Primal and Dual equilibria, in the sense
that neither is more general than the
other. Unlike Pasinetti, who strongly
insisted that his golden-age equilibrium is
a more general one, being relevant quite
independently of marginal productivity
assumptions and well-behaved
functional relationships between profit
rates and capital-output ratios, they claim
that the existence of the Dual golden age
has nothing to do with
those assumptions.
In this context, the main purpose
of their reply is to demonstrate that the
symmetry of generality between the
Dual and Primal regimes does definitely
hold for any multiple-blueprint
technology of the kind that Robinson
and MIT economists think useful to
analyze, thus establishing once and for
all that it does not depend on any
simple diminishing returns assumptions
of the neoclassical type. In providing
this constructive demonstration, SM
add, they are also able to isolate that
special technological case – which is
believed to be realistic – would provide
considerable justification for
concentrating on the Pasinetti regime to
the exclusion of the Dual on the ground
that the latter is a knife-edge solution.
For simplicity, they assume a
single consumption good and a finite
number, large or small, of different
blueprint pages, each corresponding to
a different activity or capital process.
As is well known, each profit rate(?)
excludes many pages of the blueprints
as not being competitively viable,
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t h a tc a nb ev i a b l ea tt h eg i v e n
golden-age profit rate. They stress that
nothing well-behaved is assumed about
technology other than that the
factor-price frontier relating real wage
and profit rate(?) must be
downward-sloping, so that this frontier
may have changing curvatures and
along it there may be reswitching
effects of the Cohen-Sraffa type, shifts
toward lower capital-output ratios as
profit rate falls, and any kind of
Wicksell effects. No singular
equal-factor-intensity assumptions are
made that might validate any surrogate
capital concepts.
N e x t ,t h e ya s s u m ean a t u r a lr a t e
of labor growth of, n, that is positive,
for simplicity of exposition ignoring
Harrod-neutral technical change. The
question arising then regards what
golden-age configurations can prevail
for this natural rate of growth at each
profit rate,r. They argue that there will
emerge, for fixed n and eachr,a n
admissible configuration of processes
and price ratios: hence, and this is what
matters for their argument, there will be
for given n an admissible set of capital
values and ratios of aggregate capital
value to value of output, which could
be plotted against profit rates. For SM,
it is convenient to work with the
reciprocal of the aggregate
capital-output ratio, which is a
percentage per annum, but is now quite
divorced from any physical capital of
jelly or surrogate type, being merely the
ratio of value of total market stocks of
capital to value of total output.
After several algebraic and
graphical manipulations, SM are in
position to draw a figure – with sc and
sW plotted on the horizontal and
vertical axis, respectively – which shows
the division of the region of savings
coefficients into the Primal or Pasinetti
equilibrium region and the Dual
equilibrium region. Their procedure is
the following. On a first figure, they
plot the above-mentioned average
product of capital against the profit
rates for a general blueprint technology.
On another figure, they introduce a
saving behavior of the Pasinetti type,
with sc and sW plotted on the
horizontal and vertical axis,
respectively. Thus, from any point on
this latter figure, with its specified
(sc , sW )values, and with n given, they
go back to the former figure and find
the corresponding golden-age
equilibrium point or points. It is their
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general blueprint technology; and when
it is done, they find that there are two
symmetrical regions, corresponding to
the Primal and Dual equilibria.
As for Robinson’s comment on
their contribution, their reply is not
extensive. They interpret her main
contention – that they did put the
rabbit into the hat in full view of the
audience before drawing it out again –
as meaning that their logical theorems
do follow correctly from their axiomatic
conditions; in their view, this is a fact
for self-congratulation not apology!
According to them, Robinson’s further
implication, namely, that their logical
proofs of stability and existence are so
transparently obvious as to involve a
trivial waste of time, reveals more what
she considers tiresome than an
objective finding. Besides, they argue
that in her (incomplete) summary of
their analysis, there is naught for them
to quarrel with or to give comfort to
Pasinetti’s critique. What is useful in her
comment being the remainder that the
one-sector leets model does have
special properties that must not be
extrapolated to more general models.
In their reply, however, they claim to
have returned good for good,
showing graphically what happens
to existence problems in a general
blueprint technology.2
4_ Closing remarks
Kaldor’s (1955-1956) delivered a
consistent solution to Harrod´s
long-run problem of having the
warranted growth rate, which is given
by the ratio of the average propensity to
save to the capital-output ratio, to equal
the natural growth rate, which is given
by the growth rate of labor supply plus
the rate of technological change.
Though the growth rate is rather
assumed to be at Harrod´s natural rate,
functional income distribution is
determined by the requirement that
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2 Several authors, though not
discussed here, have
subsequently extended and
modified the Kaldor-Pasinetti
approach by considering
different rates of return for
capitalists and workers, more
general saving functions,
internal financing of
investment by firms, varying
capacity utilization and
employment, financial assets,
government fiscal policy, and
open economy issues – see
Baranzini (1991) for an early
account, and Panico and
Salvadori (1993) for a
re-publication of some of the
relevant papers; see also
Commendatore et al. (2003)
for a recent account. Indeed,
this large literature has shown
that the Pasinetti paradox
obtains under a much wider
range of conditions – though
not under all – than those
considered initially by
Pasinetti himself.savings is equal to autonomous
investment, with Harrod´s long-run
problem being solved through
changes in the average propensity to
save brought about by changes in
income distribution.
Pasinetti (1962) correctly argued
that Kaldor had neglected to take into
account the fact that wage earners who
saved would have two sources of
income, namely from wages and from
returns to capital wealth. Nonetheless,
Pasinetti developed a growth model
which shows the irrelevance of workers’
propensity to save while uncovering the
very strategic importance of the
decisions to save of capitalists, a result
w h i c hh a sb e e nt a k e nt od e m o n s t r a t e
the inability of workers to directly
influence income distribution in the
long run. While the duality theorem
derived by Samuelson and Modigliani
(1966) did seem to restrict the generality
of Pasinetti’s analysis, the neo-Pasinetti
theorem that Kaldor delivered in
rebuttal did come to the rescue of the
post- Keynesian approach to
distribution based on (some variant of)
the Cambridge equation.
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